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Social safety nets in developing countries are far smaller than in devel-
oped economies. In 1996, the average expenditure on social insurance as a
fraction of GDP in countries with below-median per capita income was 6.8
percent; the corresponding ﬁgure in above-median countries was 18.5 per-
cent (International Labour Organization 2000).1 In the rapidly growing
developing economies of South and East Asia, social insurance may be
viewed as an unnecessary precaution that could potentially hamper growth
without yielding substantial welfare gains. However, income shocks are
prevalent in these economies. For example, at least 15 percent of house-
holds in the Indonesian Family Life Survey report some type of income
shock in a given year. Recent large-scale shocks in this region such as the
ﬁnancial crises and the Asian tsunami further underscore the point that
rapidly growing economies are not immune to large ﬂuctuations. Hence,
studying the welfare consequences of social insurance in developing econ-
omies is an important issue from a public ﬁnance perspective.
This paper takes a step in this direction by comparing the eﬀects of
shocks on consumption and other behaviors in developing and developed
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1. See section 4.2 for further details on this data.countries. The goal of this analysis is to provide empirical estimates of elas-
ticities that are relevant in assessing the welfare consequences of social in-
surance in low-income economies.
Social insurance can only be beneﬁcial if private insurance markets are
inadequate. A straightforward and intuitive method of testing for full
private market insurance frequently implemented in the development lit-
erature is to examine consumption ﬂuctuations associated with shocks
(Townsend 1994). We begin our analysis by comparing the eﬀects of un-
employment on consumption in the United States and Indonesia. We use
two large-panel datasets that contain consumption and labor force data for
each of these countries—the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). We compare the growth rate of
food consumption for agents who remain employed and agents who report
job loss in the two panels. The mean and median consumption drop asso-
ciated with unemployment in both economies is roughly 10 percent. The
similarity in the consumption drop is remarkable given that Indonesia has
no formal UI system whereas the United States insures nearly 50 percent
of the pre-unemployment wage for most individuals. It follows that the in-
troduction of a social safety net in Indonesia would have a relatively small
eﬀect in terms of smoothing consumption, since consumption ﬂuctuations
are not very large to begin with.
While this ﬁnding might suggest that unemployment insurance cannot
have large beneﬁts in developing economies, it is important to examine the
eﬃciency costs of the behaviors used by households to smooth consump-
tion before drawing normative conclusions. If individuals mitigate con-
sumption falls by resorting to costly measures (e.g., removing children
from school) publicly provided insurance could increase welfare by obvi-
ating the need for such measures (Morduch 1999; Holzmann and Jør-
gensen 2001; Dercon 2002). It is plausible that low-income households 
resort to very costly measures to maintain consumption because their 
pre-unemployment consumption appears close to subsistence levels. In the
Indonesian sample, the average household devotes nearly 70 percent of its
budget to food, compared to 20 percent in the United States. Moreover,
many households consume signiﬁcantly fewer staples (such as rice) when
the household head becomes unemployed, suggesting that subsistence
constraints are likely to be a concern.
We make inferences about the cost of income smoothing in Indonesia by
examining the methods households use to mitigate the income loss associ-
ated with unemployment. Strikingly, parents appear to sharply reduce ex-
penditures on children’s education substantially during idiosyncratic un-
employment spells (see also Thomas et al. 2004, who document similar
patterns during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis). To the extent that these reduc-
tions permanently diminish children’s educational attainment, the welfare
costs of transitory unemployment shocks could be particularly large and
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labor supply to maintain their income stream. This high degree of respon-
siveness is further evidence that consumption-smoothing requires sub-
stantial changes in economic behavior for many Indonesian households. In
contrast, households in the United States typically accomplish consump-
tion smoothing by much less costly methods: depleting buﬀer stocks, bor-
rowing, and using social insurance beneﬁts (Dynarski and Gruber 1997).
In summary, the empirical evidence suggests that social insurance
against transitory shocks in developing countries could have substantial
welfare beneﬁts by reducing the use of ineﬃcient smoothing techniques
even though consumption volatility may not fall much. In a companion pa-
per (Chetty and Looney 2006), we establish this point formally in a simple
model of risk and insurance by showing that the marginal beneﬁt of insur-
ance can be large when consumption drops are small because a high level
of risk aversion leads to use of costly smoothing methods.
Of course, since we focus only on the beneﬁts of social insurance in this
paper, one cannot conclude from the results here that introducing a large
safety net will raise aggregate welfare. The eﬃciency costs of social safety
nets (e.g., reduced employment or opportunity costs such as forgone in-
frastructure or health investments) may also be large. On the other hand,
the provision of unemployment insurance could also have eﬃciency-
enhancing eﬀects such as improved job matches and increased productiv-
ity (Acemoglu and Shimer 1999). Hence, the most important lesson of this
study is perhaps that further research on social insurance programs in de-
veloping economies would be useful given their potential beneﬁts.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section brieﬂy
describes existing social safety nets around the world. Section 4.3 com-
pares the eﬀects of unemployment on consumption in the United States
and Indonesia empirically. Section 4.4 presents evidence on the cost of
consumption smoothing methods used in Indonesia. Section 4.5 oﬀers
concluding remarks.
4.2 Social Safety Nets in Developing Countries
The size of the formal government-provided social safety net is substan-
tially smaller in developing countries than in developed economies. Ac-
cording to statistics collected by the International Labour Organization
(2000) for 91 countries in 1996, the average GDP share of social insur-
ance—deﬁned as total expenditures on social security, disability insur-
ance, unemployment insurance, insurance against work-related injuries,
and government provided health insurance—was 12.5 percent, with a
range spanning 0.7 percent to 34.7 percent. Panel A of ﬁgure 4.1 plots the
fraction of GDP devoted to social insurance programs against PPP-
adjusted GDP per capita for these countries (with log scales). There is a
Income Risk and the Beneﬁts of Social Insurance 101Fig. 4.1 A, Social insurance versus GDP per capita in 1996; B, government budget
share of social insurance versus GDP per capita
Sources: Social Insurance statistics are from ILO (2000); GDP statistics are from the Penn
World tables.
Notes: GDP is measured in 1996 U.S. dollars. Panel A shows relationship between social in-
surance share of GDP and GDP per capita. Panel B shows relationship between social insur-
ance share of government budget and GDP per capita.
A
Bstriking positive correlation between these two variables. As shown in spec-
iﬁcation 1 of table 4.1, a 1 percent increase in GDP per capita is associated
with a 0.7 percent increase in the GDP share of social insurance in this
cross-section. Perhaps more interestingly, the share of social insurance in
government expenditure is also signiﬁcantly higher in richer countries
(panel B of ﬁgure 4.1 and speciﬁcation 2 in table 4.1). Wealthier countries
not only have higher government expenditures, but they also devote a
larger fraction of those expenditures to social insurance.
Notably, the rapidly growing East Asian economies are on average 1.3
log units below the trend line plotted in ﬁgure 4.1. In other words, they de-
vote about 10 percentage points less of GDP to social insurance than other
countries of similar income. East Asian economies devote on average 4.9
percent of their GDP to social insurance, compared with 16.5 percent in
the United States and 22 percent in Europe. The positive relationship 
between GDP per capita and social safety nets is evident even among 
the small subsample of East Asian economies, with Indonesia having the
lowest income and expenditure on social insurance and Japan having the
highest of both.
These statistics understate the size of the social safety net in developing
countries because they ignore other forms of in-kind and charity assis-
tance, such as minimum food grants and non-governmental (NGO) aid.
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Table 4.1 Relationship between social insurance and per capita GDP
SI as % of 
government
SI as % of  expenditure vs.  Continent East Asian
GDP vs. GDP GDP (log SI % dummies countries
(log SI % of government (log SI % (log SI %
of GDP) expenditure) of GDP) of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP per capita 0.630 0.351 0.357 0.674
(0.070)** (0.064)** (0.069)** (0.062)**
Constant –3.376 0.267 –3.673
(0.626)** (0.589) (0.550)**
East Asia indicator –1.318
(0.250)**
Continent dummies No No Yes No
No. of observations 89 64 89 89
Sources: Social insurance statistics are from ILO (2000); GDP statistics are from the Penn World tables.
Notes: Social insurance is deﬁned as sum of expenditures on social security, disability insurance, unem-
ployment insurance, insurance against work-related injuries, and government-provided health insur-
ance. East Asian countries in the sample are Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singa-
pore. GDP is measured in 1996 U.S. dollars. For columns (1), (3), and (4), dependent variable is log SI
% of GDP. For column (2), dependent variable is log SI % of government expenditure.However, these types of programs are generally quite limited in size (Gough
et al. 2004) and have two features that considerably limit their scope relative
to western social safety nets. First, they are often means-tested and so may
not provide consumption-smoothing beneﬁts to a majority of the popula-
tion. Second, aid tends to ﬂow toward large-scale catastrophes (such as the
recent tsunami), with signiﬁcantly fewer funds available for the smaller but
more numerous idiosyncratic shocks like unemployment or disability.
There are many reasons that developing countries might choose not to
implement such social safety nets. The most plausible reason is that ﬁ-
nancing such systems is infeasible given limitations on the government’s
ability to raise revenue (Gordon and Li 2005). While it is important to un-
derstand the political economy of social insurance in developing countries,
the purpose of this study is to assess the normative value of such a program
if it could be implemented. As illustrated by the recent introduction of a
formal unemployment insurance system in Korea, some of these countries
are reaching a point where such systems are feasible, making this norma-
tive question of practical relevance.
4.3 Consumption Fluctuations in Indonesia and the United States
The ﬁrst step in determining whether there is a role for social insurance
is to determine whether private insurance markets are adequate for agents
to smooth consumption over shocks. The standard method of testing for
full consumption insurance, originally implemented by Cochrane (1991)
using U.S. data and Townsend (1994) using data on Indian farmers, is to
directly examine the eﬀect of idiosyncratic shocks such as job loss, health
changes, or weather shocks on consumption. Under the assumption that
utility is additively separable over consumption and leisure, a drop in con-
sumption associated with these shocks is evidence that insurance markets
are incomplete. More recently, in the public ﬁnance literature, Gruber
(1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001) have implemented tests of full in-
surance that do not rely on additive separability by examining whether the
size of consumption drops during unemployment spells is related to the
amount of government-provided unemployment insurance. Their estimates
show that with full unemployment insurance, consumption would not fall
at all during job loss, implying that most or all of the consumption ﬂuctu-
ations identiﬁed in prior studies are indeed attributable to incomplete in-
surance rather than complementarity between consumption and leisure.
Following this literature, we begin our comparison of the welfare gains
of social insurance in developing versus developed economies by examin-
ing consumption ﬂuctuations. We ﬁrst establish consistent measures of
consumption drops for a speciﬁc shock in two economies. The shock we fo-
cus on is unemployment, since it is a well-deﬁned and common event in
both types of economies. We focus on the United States as the developed
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availability of the longitudinal Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
data there. We focus on Indonesia as the developing economy because it
has high-quality panel data with a design very similar to the PSID. Indone-
sia also has minimal social insurance, making it an ideal laboratory in which
to investigate the response of families to idiosyncratic shocks in a low-
income economy without any social safety net. In this paper, we report re-
sults on the eﬀects of unemployment on food consumption; as we discuss in
the following, other analysis using broader measures of consumption from
diﬀerent datasets yields results similar to those we report here for food.
Our methods and empirical results are borrowed from and consistent
with a large body of prior work. Most relevant are studies that examine re-
sponses of Indonesian households to shocks. The general consensus of
these papers on Indonesia and of the literature on developing countries
more generally is that transitory shocks seldom translate into signiﬁcant
ﬂuctuations in consumption. This is because households have developed a
variety of coping mechanisms, such as depleting household wealth and
assets or borrowing (Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas 2003), increasing
family labor supply (Beegle, Frankenberg, and Thomas 2000; Cameron
and Worswick 2003), and reducing investments in children’s health and
education (Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle 1999; Thomas et al. 2004).
The smoothness of consumption has been taken to imply that economic
shocks are not costly and that the scope for publicly provided social insur-
ance for transitory shocks is small (Morduch 1995; Cameron and Wor-
swick 2003).2Our goal here is to examine the validity of this normative con-
clusion by comparing behavioral responses to risk in Indonesia and the
United States.
4.3.1 Data
We use two household-level panel datasets in this study. The ﬁrst is the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which tracks approximately
8,000 households and their children over more than 30 years in the United
States. We use an extract of the PSID that contains consistently deﬁned an-
nual data between 1980 and 1993. The second is the Indonesian Family
Life Survey (IFLS), which follows roughly 7,500 households over a span of
seven years, with interviews in 1993, 1997, and 2000.
To examine the impact of unemployment shocks, we focus on house-
holds for which longitudinal data exist and with household heads who were
employed at the time of the immediately preceding interview. Hence, we in-
clude only households in which the head was employed one year before the
Income Risk and the Beneﬁts of Social Insurance 105
2. Studies that examine large, persistent health shocks in Indonesia (Gertler and Gruber
2002, Gertler, Levine, and Moretti 2001) do ﬁnd large consumption drops. However, Gertler
and Gruber observe that their results oﬀer “little insight into consumption smoothing of
more likely and less costly risks” that are our primary focus here.current interview in the PSID, and three or four years before in the IFLS.3
We discuss in the following how the lack of annual data in the IFLS could
aﬀect the comparison between the datasets.
Table 4.2 provides summary statistics on these households. Inﬂation in
Indonesia was high over this time period, largely due to the 1998 ﬁnancial
crisis. The price level rose an average of 91 percent in the three- to four-year
periods between interviews. In comparison, average annual inﬂation in the
United States was 5 percent over our sample. The IFLS statistics reported
in table 4.2 are deﬂated using an aggregate CPI series from the Asian De-
velopment Bank and are converted to year 2000 dollars using the US/Ru-
piah exchange rate as of January 2000. The PSID statistics are deﬂated us-
ing the standard CPI series from the BLS. Note that real food consumption
growth rates are small in both samples. In our empirical analysis, we use
nominal growth rates for transparency, since inﬂation rates are thought to
diﬀer signiﬁcantly across goods and regions in Indonesia around the ﬁ-
nancial crisis. Not surprisingly, nominal growth rates are much higher in
the IFLS sample than in the PSID.
The most striking diﬀerences between the samples are in economic char-
acteristics. PSID household heads earn on average $31,828 per year and
PSID households consume $7,255 of food per year ($2,687 per person). In
contrast, IFLS households report average total incomes of $1,484, and
consume approximately $926 in food each year ($162 per person). Note
that this ﬁgure includes food purchased and food produced (important
given the large number of farmers in the data). Unemployment shocks ap-
pear more frequently in the IFLS data: approximately 8 percent of heads
of household become unemployed between interview waves while 4 per-
cent become unemployed between years in the PSID.
An important summary statistic in assessing a household’s ability to
smooth consumption is asset holdings. In Indonesia, the median house-
hold holds total assets of $2,692, which is substantially larger than annual
income for many households. However, most of this wealth is held in farm
and housing. Median liquid wealth (savings, stocks, and jewelry) is only
$21, indicating that consumption smoothing using liquid assets would be
infeasible for many households. Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas (2003)
report that few households move when they face shocks, suggesting that
homes and farms are not directly used to smooth consumption, either. In-
dividuals could in principle take secured loans against their farm and hous-
ing collateral when shocks occur. Studying the extent to which individuals
are able to use such secured loans to smooth consumption is an interesting
direction for further research.
Because of data constraints, we deﬁne unemployment spells slightly dif-
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3. We include all unemployed PSID households, and not just those who report receiving
unemployment beneﬁts.ferently in the two samples. In the PSID, a household head is deﬁned to be
unemployed if he or she is not working and searching for a job at the time
of the interview. Replicating this measure in the IFLS is not always possible
because weekly employment data (module TK) for the 1997 interview has
not yet been publicly released. Instead, we use a question corresponding to
employment status during the last 12 months. In 1993 and 2000, when both
weekly and annual employment statistics are available, these measures are
highly correlated and we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of unemployment on con-
sumption are very similar regardless of which variable is used. We use the
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Currently unemployed 8% 0 27%
Age of head 48 46 25
Married 83% 1 37%
College 6% 0 24%
Number of people in household 5.7 5.0 2.5
Food consumption $926 $703 $1,065
Read food consumption growth rate 4% 3% 61%
Inﬂation rate 91% 132% 42%
Staples consumption $191 $144 $247
Total consumption $1,604 $1,073 $2,047
Wage income of head $580 $308 $1,056
Other family members earn income 58% 1 49%
Total household income $1,484 $811 $3,569
Total household assets $7,525 $2,692 $17,189
Home and land $5,625 $1,999 $12,054
Equipment, livestock, vehicles, and other $1,587 $352 $8,057
Liquid assets (cash, stock, jewelry) $313 $21 $2,295
No household member is a farmer 58% 1 49%
Education expenditure $144 $49 $344
Positive education expenditure 77% 1 42%
PSID (United States)
Currently unemployed 4% 0 21%
Age of head 38 36 12
Married 65% 1 48%
College 40% 0 49%
Number of people in household  2.7 3.0 1.4
Food consumption $7,255 $6,303 $4,646
Real food consumption growth rate 2% 3% 56%
Inﬂation rate 5% 4% 2%
Wage income of head $31,828 $27,285 $30,267
Notes: All monetary values are annual ﬁgures in real 2000 U.S. dollars. Education expendi-
ture data are for households with children under 24 years old. For Indonesia, number of ob-
servations = 12,236; number of households = 7,197. For the United States, number of obser-
vations = 70,889; number of households = 11,685.annual employment variable to maximize the sample size and to avoid fo-
cusing only on changes in outcomes over seven years, as required if we
dropped 1997 interview information.
A concern with our deﬁnition of unemployment in the IFLS data is that
the IFLS annual employment variable provides little detail on employment
status, so that we cannot always diﬀerentiate involuntary unemployment
from endogenous transitions out of the labor force such as retirement. The
work by Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle (1999) addresses this issue bet-
ter by using additional unpublished data. The results we report in the fol-
lowing are very similar to their results. In addition, when we restrict the
sample to cases for which we do know whether the individual is still in the
labor force, we obtain similar point estimates. These ﬁndings suggest that
this limitation of our data is not a signiﬁcant source of bias.
4.3.2 Results
We begin our analysis with a simple comparison of growth rates of food
consumption in the United States and Indonesia. Deﬁne the growth rate of
food consumption for household i from year t to year t  as
git   log cit   log cit 
where cit denotes household i’s food consumption in period t. Ideally, the
gap between t and t  would be small, but in Indonesia data are available
only every three to four years, while in the United States data are annual.
In the baseline analysis, we attempt to get as close a measure to the true
drop as possible in each dataset, by examining the growth rate from t to 
t   1 in the United States and t to t   3 or t   4 (as data permit) in In-
donesia.
Our basic identiﬁcation strategy is to divide our sample of employed
heads-of-household in the preperiod year t  into two groups: Job losers,
who reported being unemployed at the time of the survey in year t, and job
keepers, who reported still having a job. We then compare the distribution
of growth rates for these two groups to estimate the eﬀect of unemploy-
ment on consumption. The key identiﬁcation assumption that must hold
for this method to give a consistent estimate of the causal eﬀect of unem-
ployment on consumption growth is that the treatment group of job losers
and the control group of job keepers have identical consumption growth
rates absent the shock. This identiﬁcation assumption may be questionable
given that individuals prone to job loss are generally lower skill types, and
therefore may have relatively lower rates of trend wage and consumption
growth in a society with increasing income inequality. In this case, the
simple diﬀerences in the following will overstate the true consumption
drop caused by unemployment. We implement some tests to address this
concern in the following.
We ﬁrst demonstrate the eﬀect of unemployment on food consumption
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ﬁgure 4.2. This ﬁgure is constructed by redeﬁning as year 0 the year of job
loss for the set of household heads who lost their jobs once during the
PSID sample. We then plot real average annual consumption growth rates
(more precisely, change in real log household consumption) against year
relative to year of job loss (e.g., –3 is three years before job loss). The ﬁgure
shows that food consumption grows at a real rate of roughly 2 to 4 percent
per year before time 0, and then drops by nearly 10 percent in the year of
job loss. Consumption then recovers gradually over the next few years
back to its original level. This graph conﬁrms that unemployment causes a
sharp, temporary decline in consumption for the typical household in the
United States, consistent with the results of Cochrane (1991) and Gruber
(1997). Unfortunately, a similar graph showing a long pre-event and
postevent period cannot be drawn for Indonesia because there are at most
three observations per household in the IFLS. We are therefore forced to
compare single observations on growth rates in consumption from time –1
to time 0 across job losers and job keepers to identify the eﬀect of unem-
ployment in the IFLS. We adopt a similar strategy in the PSID for pur-
poses of comparability.
We begin our comparison of Indonesia and the United States with a
nonparametric, graphical analysis of the eﬀect of job loss on food con-
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Fig. 4.2 Eﬀect of unemployment on consumption growth in the United States
Source: PSID 1980–93.
Notes: Sample consists of all household heads who experienced exactly one unemployment
spell between 1980 and 1993 in the PSID. Annual growth rates of food consumption are com-
puted as change in log of real (CPI deﬂated) food consumption from year t – 1 to year t. Year
of job loss is normalized at 0 and all other years are deﬁned as diﬀerence relative to that year.sumption. We estimate kernel densities for the distribution of nominal
growth rates by employment status in each country. Following the conven-
tion in the consumption growth literature (see, e.g., Zeldes 1989 or Gruber
1997), we trim outliers (the lower and upper 2 percent of the reported dis-
tribution), though our results are insensitive to this restriction. The kernel
densities are estimated using an optimalbandwidth chosen to minimize the
asymptotic mean squared error of the ﬁtted distribution. Panel A of ﬁgure
4.3 plots the density of growth rates for job losers (red) and keepers (blue)
in Indonesia. It is clear that unemployment leads to a left-shift in the dis-
tribution, indicating that households are unable to fully smooth consump-
tion over this transitory shock. The medians of each distribution are de-
picted by vertical lines of corresponding color. The median nominal
growth rate of food consumption for job keepers in the sample is 67 per-
cent (due to the high rate of inﬂation in Indonesia over this period), in
comparison with a growth rate of 56 percent for job losers. Hence, at the
median, unemployment appears to reduce food consumption by approxi-
mately 11 percent.
Panel B of ﬁgure 4.3 plots analogous densities for the United States.
Again, it is clear that agents are not fully insured, consistent with the re-
sults of Gruber (1997). Of greater interest here is the comparison of these
distributions to their analogs in Indonesia. The distribution of growth
rates reported by Indonesian households has variance twice as high as that
in the United States, which could be either because of measurement error
or because outcomes in developing countries tend to be more stochastic.
Despite this general diﬀerence in the distributions, the within-sample
diﬀerence between job losers and job keepers is strikingly similar. In the
United States, the median nominal growth rate for job keepers is approxi-
mately 8.5 percent, compared to –1.5 percent for job losers. Hence, job loss
appears to reduce food consumption by approximately 10 percent in the
United States, only 1 percent diﬀerent from the Indonesian value. Other
quantiles of the distribution shifts are also quite similar across the two
economies.4
We now examine the robustness of this conclusion to controls using a
more structured regression analysis. We estimate speciﬁcations of the fol-
lowing form:
(1) gi      unempi    Xi   εi
where unempi   1 if the agent reports unemployment at time t , unempi  
0 if the agent is employed at time t , and Xi denotes a vector of covariates.
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4. The estimated consumption drops become larger in the PSID if we use changes from t to
t   3 (as in the IFLS). Hence, using a comparable strategy across the two data sets only fur-
ther reinforces the point that consumption is as smooth during shocks in Indonesia as it is in
the United States.Fig. 4.3 A, Eﬀect of unemployment on food consumption in Indonesia; B, Eﬀect of
unemployment on food consumption in the United States.
Sources: For panel A, IFLS (1993–2000). For panel B, PSID (1980–93).
Notes:In each panel, vertical lines denote median for density of corresponding color. Sample
consists of all household heads in IFLS or PSID who reported being employed at the time of
previous interview. Stayed Employed group includes household heads who remain employed
in interview t. Became Unemployed group includes household heads who are not working at
time of interview t. Growth rate of household food consumption is deﬁned as nominal diﬀer-
ence in log food consumption in interview tand interview t– 1. Gap between interviews is one
year in PSID and three or four years in IFLS. Observations with growth rates in top 2 percent
or bottom 2 percent of unconditional food growth distribution in each dataset are discarded
to trim outliers. Kernel densities are estimated using an optimal bandwidth procedure.The key coeﬃcient   equals the eﬀect of job loss on the consumption
growth rate.
Table 4.3 reports several estimates of equation (1) for Indonesia and the
United States. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is estimated with OLS using no con-
trols except year dummies. Consistent with the graphical results, unem-
ployment is estimated to reduce consumption by about 9 percent in the
United States and 10 percent in Indonesia. The second speciﬁcation intro-
duces several controls: age, gender, marital status, education, and region
dummies (to control for diﬀerential inﬂation patterns). The coeﬃcient es-
timates on the unemployment dummy are essentially unchanged. These re-
sults show that after controlling for observable heterogeneity in trend
growth rates across job losers and job keepers, consumption drops remain
quite similar in the two countries.
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Table 4.3 Effect of unemployment insurance on food consumption in Indonesia and the 
United States
(3)
(1) (2) Only those unemployed
No controls With controls exactly once
U.S. Indonesia U.S. Indonesia U.S. Indonesia
Unemployed dummy –0.087 –0.097 –0.106 –0.078 –0.095 –0.098
(0.006)*** (0.027)*** (0.010)*** (0.022)*** (0.017)*** (0.038)**
People in household 0.01 –0.005 0.012 –0.004
(0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.005)** (0.007)
Age –0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Married 0.033 0.057 0.032 0.02
(0.007)*** (0.027)** (0.018)* (0.06)
Sex –0.012 –0.007 0.006 –0.035
(0.007)* (0.014) (0.017) (0.03)
School 0.000 –0.005 0.000 0.005
(0.000) (0.008) (0.001) (0.025)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province/state 
dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 50,769 11,284 50,763 11,284 7,894 1,231
Notes: Dependent variable = food consumption growth rate (change in log household food consump-
tion). Sample includes all households who remain in panel for two or more years in which head is em-
ployed in previous observation. Observations with nominal food consumption growth rates in bottom 2
percent and top 2 percent of distribution are discarded to trim outliers. Dependent variable in all spec-
iﬁcations is log(ct) – log(ct–1), where t – 1 refers to the previous observation (one year lag in PSID, three
or four years in IFLS). Unemployed dummy is 1 if head of household is not working at time of interview;
else 0.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.The third speciﬁcation tests the common trends identiﬁcation assump-
tion more directly by restricting the sample to individuals who lost jobs at
some point within the panel. In this speciﬁcation, the counterfactual for
the job losers in year t  are individuals who lost their jobs at some other
point in the dataset. The advantage of this speciﬁcation in terms of identi-
ﬁcation is that growth rates in consumption for job losers are compared to
what is arguably a better control group. The problem of unobservable
diﬀerences between job losers and keepers is mitigated in the restricted
sample by identifying purely from variation in the date of job loss rather
than whether or not job loss occurred. As shown in the last two columns of
the table, this smaller sample yields estimates that are generally similar to
the original results, supporting the claim that the causal eﬀect of the un-
employment shock on consumption is being identiﬁed.
One concern with these results is that unemployment shocks induce
changes in consumption because of changes in expectations about perma-
nent income rather than a transitory shock. To test this alternative hy-
pothesis, we compared consumption growth rates from period tto t 1 for
individuals who became unemployed in period t versus those who kept
their jobs in period t. We ﬁnd that consumption grows 8 to 10 percent more
from t to t   1 for the job losers, indicating that food consumption recov-
ers to pre-unemployment levels within three years after the shock for the
average household. This result supports the view that unemployment is a
transitory shock that aﬀects consumption because of inability to smooth.
We also conducted a series of other robustness checks and sensitivity
analyses that are not reported in the table. Quantile regressions generally
yield estimates very similar to the OLS results. Diﬀerent trimming criteria
for outliers, such as 1 percent or 5 percent, also yield similar results.
Broader measures of consumption also follow a similar pattern. Gruber
(1998) augments the results from the PSID with broader measures of con-
sumption from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and ﬁnds that the de-
cline in total consumption mirrors that of food consumption. We ﬁnd a sim-
ilar decline in total consumption in the IFLS sample as well (not reported).
An additional concern speciﬁc to the Indonesian sample is that all
households, including job keepers, may have reduced consumption during
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 to 1998. This could bias our estimates of
the consumption drop associated with unemployment downward in this
sample. To address this concern, we split the sample in two and repeated
the analysis using the job losers/keepers in 2000 and job losers/keepers in
1997 separately. The estimates of the consumption drop associated with
unemployment are similar in both subsamples. This suggests that the ﬁ-
nancial crisis does not create signiﬁcant bias: If consumption was unusu-
ally low throughout the economy in 1997, job keepers should have experi-
enced excess growth in consumption between 1997 and 2000, biasing the
estimate of the consumption drop upward in the 2000 sample.
Income Risk and the Beneﬁts of Social Insurance 113To summarize, the evidence from the IFLS and the PSID suggests that
idiosyncratic unemployment shocks lead to temporary consumption ﬂuc-
tuations of similar magnitude in the United States and Indonesia. This
similarity is surprising given that the United States has a large UI system
that replaces approximately 50 percent of preunemployment wages for
most individuals, whereas Indonesia has very little formal social insurance
(ﬁgure 4.1).
These results may appear to suggest that families in Indonesia (and per-
haps other developing economies) have adequate insurance because they
are able to maintain a reasonably smooth consumption path when faced
with shocks, as originally suggested by Townsend’s (1994) classic study of
Indian farmers. In this case, social insurance would oﬀer relatively modest
welfare gains in these economies. However, the smoothness of household
consumption may belie signiﬁcant costs of income risk if households resort
to costly smoothing methods. Intuitively, social insurance may provide
welfare gains if it crowds out the use of more costly smoothing techniques.
The next section explores how households maintain consumption while
unemployed in Indonesia.
4.4 The Costs of Consumption Smoothing
Households would resort to costly consumption smoothing techniques
only if the welfare costs of reductions in consumption are large. We there-
fore ﬁrst evaluate the nature of consumption reductions in Indonesia to de-
termine whether such reductions are likely to have large welfare costs.
The average household in the IFLS devotes nearly 70 percent of its total
expenditure to food (in contrast with 20 percent in the PSID). This sug-
gests that Indonesians may have to reduce consumption of basic necessi-
ties much more than households in the United States when shocks occur.
To provide direct evidence on this hypothesis, we study the eﬀect of unem-
ployment shocks on the consumption of staple foods (including rice, corn,
cassava, and ﬂour) in Indonesia. Consumption of these goods would pre-
sumably fall only in the most dire circumstances, when agents are unable
to reduce consumption on luxuries, which have lower marginal utility. We
implement empirical speciﬁcations analogous to equation (1) to test
whether staples consumption falls in households experiencing unemploy-
ment shocks relative to households that do not experience such shocks.
The sample speciﬁcations and trimming procedures are analogous to those
described previously for total food consumption.
We begin with an OLS regression on the full sample. The estimate in col-
umn (1) of table 4.4 indicates that mean consumption of staple foods falls
by 6 percent during unemployment spells; however, the estimate is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. As one might expect, the magnitude of this decline is
smaller than the drop in total food consumption (see table 4.3) and total
114 Raj Chetty and Adam Looneyconsumption (not shown) because households are presumably more will-
ing to cut back on luxuries than necessities. A kernel density plot (not
shown) for growth in staples consumption by job status analogous to panel
A of ﬁgure 4.3 reveals a clear downward shift in consumption of staples for
job losers who experience the most negative growth rates, but little shift for
those who fared better. This is consistent with the claim that only the worst
oﬀ reduce consumption of staples. This suggests that even though the
change in the mean growth rate may not be statistically signiﬁcant, other
moments could reveal a more robust response. Column (2) of table 4.4 con-
ﬁrms this point by showing that median staples growth rate is 10 percent
lower for job losers relative to keepers. This estimate is highly statistically
signiﬁcant. Column (3) shows that the mean drop in staple consumption is
12 percent among households without any farmers, who might have less
capacity to store crops. In sum, these results indicate that many households
reduce consumption of the most basic and important sources of nutrition
when the household head loses his job. These ﬁndings are consistent with
those of Beegle, Frankenberg, and Thomas (2000) and Frankenberg, Smith,
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Table 4.4 Effect of unemployment on consumption of staples
OLS (1) Median reg. (2) OLS, no farmers (3)
Unemployed dummy –0.060 –0.100 –0.119
(0.039) (0.035)*** (0.048)**
People in household –0.009 –0.005 –0.013
(0.004)** –0.004 (0.006)**
Age 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Married 0.129 0.147 0.060
(0.047)*** (0.043)*** (0.068)
Sex 0.042 0.048 0.037
(0.024)* (0.022)** (0.033)
School 0.052 0.042 0.080
(0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.020)***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 9,466 9,466 5,205
Notes: Dependent variable = staples consumption growth rate (change in log staples con-
sumption). Sample includes all IFLS households who remain in panel for two or more years
and in which head is employed in previous observation. Observations with nominal staples
consumption growth rates in bottom 2 percent and top 2 percent of distribution are discarded
to trim outliers. Dependent variable in all speciﬁcations is log(ct) – log(ct–1), where t – 1 refers
to the previous observations. Unemployed dummy is 1 if head of household is not working at
time of interview; 0 otherwise. Median regression is a quantile regression at the 50th per-
centile. No farmers speciﬁcation excludes all households with one or more individual work-
ing on a farm.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.and Thomas (2003), who study the eﬀects of the 1998 Asian Financial Cri-
sis on consumption using an augmented IFLS sample.
The fact that income shocks force households to reduce consumption of
basic necessities makes it plausible that they would use very costly meth-
ods to smooth consumption. We now document some of these methodsdi-
rectly.5 One particularly costly method is reducing educational expendi-
tures on children. The ﬁrst three speciﬁcations in table 4.5 report the eﬀect
of unemployment shocks on educational investment. In these regressions,
we restrict the sample to households with children under 24 years of age
who reported educational expenses at the time of the previous interview.
Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) examine extensive-margin (participation) eﬀects
by using a dummy for positive household educational expenditure as the
dependent variable. The results reported in column (1) imply that families
experiencing unemployment were 13 percentage points more likely to stop
spending on education entirely (presumably by withdrawing their children
from school). This is a large reduction relative to the sample mean of 77
percent participation in education in this group. Controlling for household
characteristics reduces the estimated magnitude of this response slightly,
but does not alter the conclusion that unemployment shocks signiﬁcantly
reduce the likelihood a household will spend on education. Column (3) ex-
amines the intensive margin by changing the dependent variable to the log
change in education expenditures (with 2 percent trimming as previous).
Median educational expenditure falls by 12 percent in households experi-
encing unemployment. Average educational spending (not shown) falls by
less than 12 percent, largely because richer households do not appear to re-
duce expenditures as much as poorer households, for reasons similar to the
staples results. Figure 4.4 shows the distributional shift on the intensive
margin, conﬁrming the regression results visually.
These results indicate that many households reduce spending on educa-
tion to mitigate the income loss during an unemployment shock. A con-
cern with the interpretation of these results is reverse causality. One might
worry that families with children who ﬁnish school are those in which the
parent stops working, generating the observed correlation. However,
Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle (1999) and Thomas et al. (2004) have
documented similar patterns in educational expenditure among house-
holds aﬀected by the Asian Financial Crisis. These studies take advantage
of this large exogenous shock to address the identiﬁcation concerns more
carefully, suggesting that shocks do indeed cause reductions in education.
A second behavioral response, which perhaps has a lower cost than re-
ducing human capital accumulation but is nonetheless more costly than
116 Raj Chetty and Adam Looney
5. The behavioral responses examined here are only two examples among many possibili-
ties. Examining the costs of other consumption smoothing methods used by households













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.depleting savings, is augmenting labor supply by other members of the
household. Columns (4) through (6) of table 4.5 examine labor supply re-
sponses. On the extensive margin, Column (4) shows that other household
members are 17 percentage points more likely to work for wages when the
head of household becomes unemployed. Controlling for other household
characteristics does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect this conclusion. Column (6) ex-
amines the income earned by other family members on the intensive mar-
gin with a speciﬁcation analogous to (3) for educational expenditures. The
point estimate suggests that income earned by other household members
increases by 11 percent in households in which the head becomes unem-
ployed. Figure 4.5 corroborates this result visually. These results suggest
that unemployment shocks increase the labor supply of other family mem-
bers along a variety of margins. Part of these eﬀects may again be due to re-
verse causality. But other studies (e.g., Beegle, Frankenberg, Thomas 2000,
Cameron and Worswick 2003, Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas 2003) re-
port similar responses in terms of labor market participation, second jobs,
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Fig. 4.4 Eﬀect of unemployment on education (intensive margin)
Source: IFLS 1993–2000.
Note: Vertical lines denote median for density of corresponding color. Sample consists of all
household heads in IFLS who reported being employed at the time of previous interview and
who report positive educational expenditures in both previous interview and current inter-
view. Stayed Employed group includes household heads who are not working at time of inter-
view t. Growth rate of is deﬁned as nominal diﬀerence in log educational expenditure in in-
terview  t and interview t – 1. Gap between interviews is three or four years in IFLS.
Observations with growth rates in top 2 percent or bottom 2 percent of unconditional edu-
cational expenditure growth distribution are discarded to trim outliers. Kernel densities are
estimated using an optimal bandwidth procedure. See table 4.5 for corresponding results on
extensive margin.and additional hours of work among household members using better
identiﬁcation of exogenous shocks.
The methods used to smooth consumption in Indonesia contrast
sharply with corresponding patterns in the United States. Dynarski and
Gruber (1997) examine how households smooth variable earnings in the
United States. They ﬁnd that (a) transfer income (e.g., unemployment in-
surance) replaces 15 cents of every dollar of lost income, (b) changes in tax
burdens replace 26 to 35 cents per dollar lost, and (c) savings are used to
replace the remaining 25 to 40 cents. In addition, Cullen and Gruber (2000)
observe that there is no change in labor supply of secondary earners at the
mean when household heads lose their jobs in the United States. On the hu-
man capital margin, there is some anecdotal evidence that investment in
human capital (e.g., graduate school applications) rises during recessions
in the United States, as people substitute timing of education intertempo-
rally to periods when the opportunity cost of going to school is low. These
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Fig. 4.5 Eﬀect of unemployment on others’ labor supply (intensive margin)
Source: IFLS 1993–2000.
Note: Vertical lines denote median for density of corresponding color. Sample consists of all
household heads in IFLS who reported being employed at the time of previous interview and
who report positive income from other family members in both previous interview and cur-
rent interview. Stayed Employedgroup includes household heads who remain employed in in-
terview t. Became Unemployed group includes household heads who are not working at time
of interview t. Growth rate of is deﬁned as nominal diﬀerence in log of other family members’
income in interview t and interview t – 1. Gap between interviews is three or four years in
IFLS. Observations with growth rates in top 2 percent or bottom 2 percent of unconditional
other-income growth distribution are discarded to trim outliers. Kernel densities are esti-
mated using an optimal bandwidth procedure. See table 4.5 for corresponding results on ex-
tensive margin.points suggest that households in lower-income countries use much more
costly smoothing mechanisms than those in developed economies.
4.5 Conclusion
Unemployment shocks induce remarkably similar reductions in food
consumption in the United States and Indonesia. However, households in
Indonesia use much more costly methods to smooth consumption than
households in the United States. Even though they may have little eﬀect on
consumption volatility, social insurance programs could yield substantial
welfare gains in developing economies by reducing the need for these costly
behaviors. These gains would arise because households would not be
forced to pull children out of school or send additional members into the
workforce to maintain consumption in the short run.
The results of this paper indicate that programs such as unemployment
insurance could be beneﬁcial in certain domains. Additional empirical
work is required to determine whether increases in social insurance bene-
ﬁts actually do reduce ineﬃcient behavior in developing economies. An-
other important caveat is that we have not examined the types of social in-
surance programs that would be feasible in developing countries. If these
programs were to oﬀer only limited or unequal coverage (e.g., to public-
sector employees), then they could induce additional behavioral distor-
tions (such as a preference for public-sector work) that could exacerbate
economic ineﬃciency. Further research is required to determine whether
the constraints imposed by the political economy of developing countries
would permit welfare-enhancing social insurance programs. This research
agenda is especially relevant for South and East Asian economies as they
reach a phase of development in which implementation of a formal social
safety net is feasible.
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